This research examines wage differentials associated to different collective bargaining regimes in Spain and their evolution over time based on matched employer-employee microdata. The primary objective is to analyse the wage differentials associated to the presence of a firm-level agreement and how they have evolved, taking into account the changes in the economic cycle and the recent labour reform of 2012. The second objective of the study is to examine the impact on wages of an absence of a collective agreement.
Introduction
The aim of this research is to analyse the wage differentials existing in the Spanish labour market between different types of collective agreement, specifically between firm (or establishment) agreements and sectoral agreements (provincial or national) . With data corresponding to the years 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 , the study seeks to analyse the evolution of the wage premium of firm-level agreements over the years and, more specifically, whether this premium is sensitive to the economic cycle and whether it has been affected by the 2012 labour reform.
In addition, for the period 2010-2014, the wage differentials (both average and those across the wage distribution) existing between the three levels of bargaining are analysed: firm-level agreement, sectoral agreement and, as a novelty, the absence of an agreement, due to the increase in the number of firms applying this regime as a result of the labour reform.
Much like the North American literature on wage differentials between unionised and non-unionised workers, a range of studies has been carried out for certain European countries which analyse -given the institutional diversity between the two sides of the Atlantic -the wage differentials between workers covered by a collective agreement and those who are not, but especially the differentials between different types of agreements, as most European countries have a high level of coverage. A common finding of these studies is the detection of a positive wage premium for workers covered by an agreement as opposed to those who are not. Stephan and Gerlach (2005) , Gürtzgen (2006) and Heinbach and Spindler (2007) , among other more recent studies, estimate these positive premiums for Germany, a country where the regime of an absence of collective bargaining agreements has expanded. Evidence is available for a greater number of countries in terms of estimating a positive premium for employees covered by firm-level agreements with respect to those covered by higher-level agreements. Different studies coincide in estimating positive premiums, although of different sizes due partly to the use of different methodologies and because they refer to countries with their own institutional frameworks (Rycx, 2003 for Belgium;
Card and de la Rica, 2006 for Spain; Plasman et al., 2007 for Denmark, Belgium and Spain; Daouli et al., 2013 for Greece; Dahl et al., 2013 for Denmark; Andreasson, 2014 for Sweden and Addison et al., 2014 for Germany, although -also for Germany - Gürtzgen, 2016 does not find any evidence of this positive premium).
The hypotheses regarding both the power of collective bargaining and wage efficiency offered by firms can explain these positive wage premiums. There is no agreement, however, with respect to the effect on wage dispersion. Therefore, in some studies and countries there seems to be wider dispersion in the firm-level agreements as it is understood that within this bargaining framework the firm has greater autonomy to adjust wages to the productivity of the workers. However, there is also evidence of the contrary, supported by the argument that the firm-level agreement responds to the strength and pressure of the unions and a central objective of the unions is to reduce wage differentials between workers.
One aspect which the literature has not addressed is the sensitivity of these wage premiums to the economic cycle, which constitutes one of the objectives of this study.
The evidence regarding wage differentials by type of agreement for the Spanish case is very limited and outdated as it refers only to 1995. As mentioned above, Card and de la Rica (2006) and Plasman et al (2007) estimate a positive wage premium for the firmlevel agreements with respect to sectoral agreements. Regards dispersion, Card and de la Rica (2006) , Dell'Aringa and Pagani (2007) and Canal and Rodríguez (2016) coincide in that firm-level agreements increase wage inequality slightly, while Plasman et al (2007) find a reduction in the differences in these agreements.
Analysing the Spanish case is particularly interesting for different reasons. On the one hand, the available evidence is scarce and partly contradictory. It also refers to a time in the distant past. On the other hand, the Spanish economy and its labour market have experienced a long-lasting deep economic crisis with unemployment reaching extreme levels, which may have altered the bargaining capacity of the workers and created difficulties for firms to continue paying efficiency wages. A third reason is that in 2012 a broad labour reform was passed which modified multiple aspects of the labour framework with potentially significant effects on wage levels.
The effects of the 2012 labour reform on wage premiums can be summarised in the following hypotheses: 1) The premium of the firm-level agreements with respect to the sectoral agreements may have grown due to the reform of Article 41 of the Workers' Statute (more favourable wages and working conditions than the agreement) and due to the possible overriding of supra-firm agreements. It may have reduced, however, due to the greater decentralisation of bargaining. The possible effect of the limitation of ultra-activity seems minimal.
2) The premium of the sectoral agreements with respect to workers not covered will a priori reduce due to the modifications made to Article 41 and the possibility of an overriding of the sectoral agreement.
The study makes several contributions. First, it quantifies the wage premium between the different types of agreement for the years 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 . For the latter two years it also analyses the premium with respect to a regime of an absence of an agreement, an aspect which, to date, has only been studied for Germany. Second, it identifies the bargaining level at which the wage differentials are greatest by conducting an analysis across the complete wage distribution. Third, the evolution of the differences between types of agreement and between the quantiles of the distribution provides evidence on whether it has varied slightly with the end of growth and the impact of the deep recession.
The study is structured as follows. The following section provides a description of the Spanish institutional collective bargaining framework. Next, a brief literature review is conducted. Subsequently, the databases are described and the evidence obtained is presented. The study ends by drawing the main conclusions.
Institutional framework of collective bargaining in Spain
After returning to democracy, Spain regulated the labour market following the model in force in neighbouring countries of Western Europe. The system for determining wages was approved in the Workers' Statute of 1980. As well as using the example mentioned as a reference, it sought to compensate some individual features derived from the young democracy, such as the low union membership and the under-representation of the unions in an economy predominated by small and medium-sized firms.
Consequently, the Workers' Statute established that the unions obtain the capacity to negotiate collective agreements based on a minimum result in the union elections (10%, or 15% regional), irrespective of the number of members. The agreements are negotiated by sector -usually on a provincial level -between the business associations and the unions that have obtained the minimum number of representatives in the union elections: in this way many small and medium-sized firms are not present at either side of the table in the negotiations. Despite this, all of the firms of a sector -including those not present in the negotiation -are obliged to apply the agreement because it has the force of law and must be fulfilled by all firms in the same sector and territory, according to the general principle of automatic effectiveness. Therefore, the agreement legally extends to all firms automatically, irrespective of their size and without the need for them to adhere to it and it applies to all workers, both unionised and not. Furthermore, until the reform of 2012, the agreements had an unlimited validity as they were indefinitely renewed when they expired until a new agreement was made (ultra-activity). These features explain the very high coverage of collective bargaining in Spain (around 80% of wage earners), although there is a very low union density (approximately 18%) (ILO, 2015) .
There is also the possibility of negotiating firm-level agreements. Bargaining is carried out by the board of directors and the firm worker's committee (or the personnel delegates in firms of less than 50 workers). The firm-level agreements cannot establish conditions that are worse for the workers than the sectoral agreements, which completely predominated until 1994 after which they continued to be prevalent but with certain limitations until 2012. These legal restrictions and the small size of Spanish firms explain the low incidence of decentralised bargaining and the low percentage of workers covered by these firm-level agreements (11% before the labour reform). In practice, firm-level agreements are negotiated on the request of the firm worker's committee in large-size firms with a high union presence, generating higher wages than in sectoral agreements.
The far-reaching labour reform approved in 2012 amidst the economic crisis gave rise to different changes in the collective bargaining system 1 . These changes sought to facilitate wage flexibility on a micro-economic level and enable fast modifications to be made to wages and other conditions so as to adapt to the economic cycle. Regarding collective bargaining and wage determination, the legal changes focused on four aspects: a) the reform introduced the applicative priority of firm-level agreements over sectoral agreements, with very few exceptions, promoting, therefore, the decentralisation of collective bargaining; b) it facilitated the overriding of the sectoral 1 For a review of recent changes in the characteristics of collective bargaining in OECD countries see Visser (2016). agreements; c) it enabled firms to revoke the most advantageous conditions that the sectoral agreement may have been applying (including wages, hours worked and work schedule), and d) it limited the validity (ultra-activity) to one year after the finalisation of the agreement.
The literature studying the impact on wages of these modifications of the legal framework concludes that there was an acceleration of wage adjustment which coincided with the approval of the reform. One of the most evident effects of the reform is precisely wage moderations which has given rise to greater macro-economic wage flexibility (Izquierdo et al., 2013; Arpaia et al., 2015; International Monetary Fund, 2015 and Puente, 2015) . There is also evidence to sustain that the wage adjustment has not affected all workers equally, but has had a greater impact on new hires (Fernández-Kranz, 2015; OECD, 2015 and Orsini, 2014) and low wage earners (López-Mourelo and Malo, 2015) . The evidence on microeconomic wage flexibility, on the other hand, is scarce. It is worth pointing out that the IMF (2015) has observed that after the implementation of the reform, sectoral and regional wages continue to respond very weakly to specific variations in the economic circumstances of their respective environments. To date, the literature has not analysed the effect that the labour reform could have had on the wage differentials in accordance with the bargaining regime.
The effect of the labour reform on theses wage differentials depends largely on the effective use made by employers of each of the above-mentioned wage flexibility factors. So, following the increased decentralisation of bargaining, the new firm agreements correspond to smaller firms, which are predictably less productive, and therefore pay lower wages, contributing to reducing the wage gap between firm and sectoral agreements. The possibility of not applying the sectoral agreement can generate effects that are difficult to predict as they depend largely on the response of the firm in the WES questionnaire regarding the type of agreement that it is covered by.
Nevertheless, the effect would be very small as non-application has affected only 0.14% of firms with an agreement (Rodriguez and Canal, 2016) . The revoking of conditions which are more advantageous than those in the agreement (Article 41 of the Workers' Statute) will have reduced the difference between the agreed wage and the wage that is effectively paid 2 . As this revocation will have been applied mainly in firms with a sectoral agreement, it is expected, ceteris paribus, that the wage gap will increase between the two types of agreement. On the other hand, there will be a reduction in the wage differential between the wages of firms with a sectoral agreement and those of firms without an agreement. The size of the effect will depend on the number of firms that have used this flexibility measure, which can be assumed to be very few according to what can be deduced from other sources (Izquierdo and Jimeno, 2015) . Finally, the reduction of the ultra-activity to one year will not have had any relevant effects, as in 2014, the Spanish Supreme Court ruled that the conditions agreed in the expired agreement will remain unchanged in the employment contracts of the workers. In summary, the effects of the 2012 labour reform on wage differentials depending on the bargaining regime, when they exist, will have the opposite sign (lower differential due to decentralisation and larger differential due to the reduction in the wage cushion), and, in any case they are likely to be scarce.
Literature review
Since the 1970s there has been an abundance of studies for the United States on the wage differentials between unionised and non-unionised workers (Block and Kushin, 1978; Ashenfelter, 1978) . These studies estimate a wage premium for unionised workers of around 15% 3 . There has been much criticism of these cross sectional studies (mainly wage imputation, poor classification of union status of workers and bias in the selection of the unionised workers) and doubts have been raised regarding the size of the wage premium. The estimates based on longitudinal data, even when correcting for the possible bias in the selection, only moderate the wage premium slightly (Freeman, 1984; Card, 1996) . The studies conducted by Hirsch (2004) and Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) seeking to resolve a good part of the problems confirm the previous results. For the majority of countries, including Spain, the coverage of sectoral agreements is so high that practically everybody is covered by an agreement. Therefore, in this case, only wage premiums of firm-level agreements with respect to sectoral agreements have been estimated. The studies published by Rycx (2003) for Belgium, de Card and de la Rica (2006) for Spain, de Plasman et al. (2007) for Denmark, Belgium and Spain, de Daouli et al. (2013) for Greece, de Dahl et al. (2013) for Denmark or de Andreasson (2014) for Sweden estimate premiums for firm-level agreements which are mostly between 5% and 7%.
Germany is, undoubtedly the country for which there is most literature. This is because it has a triple-level wage bargaining regime, including a significant and growing part of its business fabric that has no type of coverage. There are also rich longitudinal databases available for Germany. The studies carried out with cross-sectional data (Stephan and Gerlach, 2005; Heinbach and Spindler, 2007; Khon and Lembcke, 2007; Fitzenberger et al., 2008) estimate premiums of sectoral agreements with respect to uncovered workers of between 4% and 10% which are greater among women and in western Germany. The premiums of firm-level agreements are approximately 7%. The most recent studies carried out with longitudinal data enable the selection biases to be completely controlled and, therefore, reduce the size of the premiums to around 3% (Gürtzgen, 4 The principle characteristics and results of the European literature on the subject may be consulted In 2006; Addison et al., 2014) . In a more recent study, Gürtzgen (2016) rules out the existence of real wage premiums of the agreements once selection biases and the declining trend of firms that end up switching to a no-agreement regime are controlled.
Contrary to Germany, the evidence regarding the wage differentials by type of agreement for the Spanish case is very limited and outdated as it refers only to 1995. As mentioned above, Card and de la Rica (2006) and Plasman et al (2007) estimate a positive wage premium for the firm-level agreements with respect to sectoral agreements. The size of the premium is estimated at between 4% and 7% 5 . It is worth pointing out the efforts undertaken by Card and de la Rica (2006) to try to control the selection biases despite using cross-sectional data. The methodology that they propose has been used by subsequent literature 6 in cases where it is not possible to work with longitudinal data. Much like previous studies on the same issue, the analysis is limited to full-time employees working in the private sector, given the differences in the wage determination processes with respect to the public sector. The explanatory variables which have been considered cover both the characteristics of the individuals and their job positions and firms. The individual characteristics refer to the nationality of the individual (distinguishing between natives and immigrants); the level of general education (distinguishing between three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary education) and age (distinguishing between four brackets). The characteristics of the job positions are years of seniority in the current job and its quadratic form; the type of contract (indefinite or fixed-term); occupation (six categories) and the undertaking of supervision tasks. Finally, the attributes of the firms are the sector (twelve categories, corresponding to the sections of the CNAE-93); size (three brackets) and region (seven NUTS1).
Data
The sample of the study has filtered out observations which provide no information about the main variables of interest, such as those corresponding to individuals with hourly wages of less than 2.5 euros or over 200 euros. Furthermore, it has also eliminated observations referring to establishments with less than two observations and, in order to limit the analysis to workers employed in the private Table 1 contains information about the average hourly wage (expressed in euros and logarithms respectively), according to the level of collective bargaining during the period considered (depending on the information on the bargaining level contained in the EES, for the whole of the period a distinction is made between sector and firm-level agreements and, after 2010 the absence of an agreement is also distinguished). This evidence confirms the existence of significant wage differentials between bargaining levels, which also experience considerable changes over time. So, taking the predominant type of bargaining as a reference, namely the sector level, it is found that in firms with their own agreement, average wages are substantially higher (between 0.2 and 0.3 logarithmic points or, alternatively between approximately 20% and 30%) although the differential tends to decrease over time. The wage differential associated to firm agreements is not, however, homogeneous across the whole wage distribution (Table 2) , It has an inverted U shape, being comparatively lower at the left tail, increasing significantly in the central part of the wage distribution and falling off at the right tail. In the case of firms which are not covered by collective bargaining, the average wages are notably lower in comparative terms, although the wage penalty observed displays a significant decreasing trend between 2010 and 2014 (from 0.18 to 0.06 logarithmic points). This wage penalty is comparatively more acute in the lower part of the distribution and reduces over the length of the curve until it becomes favourable for workers in firms without agreements at the right end of the distribution in 2014. Table A .2 of the Appendix contains the descriptive statistics of the samples used in the analysis. Based on these statistics, differences in the characteristics of the workers and their job positions can be appreciated between the different bargaining regimes, which are significant and persistent over time. Therefore, taking sectoral bargaining as a reference again, it may be observed that workers employed in firms with their own agreement have differential characteristics which, in general terms, are systematically associated to higher wages. Without being exhaustive, these employees are mainly men and native; on average they have higher levels of education, they are older with more years of seniority; they display a lower incidence of fixed-term contracts and have a greater presence in large manufacturing firms with an international focus, and, as described above, with a workforce that is comparatively qualified (observed in dimensions such as age, seniority and education) and with a comparatively low presence of women and immigrants. In the case of firms without an agreement, on the other hand, in relative terms we can observe both a higher presence of certain characteristics associated to lower relative wages (including a significant incidence of women and a higher rate of fixed-term contracts) and comparatively higher wages (higher education levels and an occupational structure with a greater presence of professions which require higher levels of qualification). There is also a sectoral distribution characterised by a greater presence in activities in the services sector.
Results

Descriptive evidence
Finally, with respect to the distribution of the samples according to the bargaining regime (last row of Table A. 2), it is worth highlighting that the relative weight of collective bargaining at the firm level is relatively stable throughout the period, with values of between 20% and 25%, with the only exception being the increase experienced at the beginning of the economic crisis between 2006 and 2010. In the case of an absence of bargaining, its relative presence is comparatively lower, although over time it can be observed to increase, from 2.5% of the workforce in 2010 to 3.8% in 2014. Table 3 shows the results of estimating a Mincer equation that relates the logarithm of individual wages to different variables associated with the characteristics of the workers, their job positions and the characteristics of the firm where they work. This equation has been estimated separately for each of the samples available of the Wage Structure Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014) , using the sample elevation factors on an individual level.
Results of the analysis
The controls consider gender, nationality (native/immigrant), educational level (3 levels), age (4 categories), seniority in the firm and its square, whether workers have a dead-end contract or not, the occupational category (6 groups), the region of the establishment on a NUTS1 level (7 regions), the sector of activity (12 sectors reason, a probit model has been used to estimate the probability that a specific firm is covered by collective bargaining at the firm level as opposed to a higher level agreement. This model has been estimated for each of the years available, introducing the characteristics of the firm and its workers as explanatory variables. This has enabled a propensity score to be obtained which was subsequently introduced as an additional regressor in the Mincer equations for each of the four waves considered. For the two waves corresponding to 2010 and 2014, the same procedure has been carried out for the probability of not having an agreement as opposed to the probability of having a sectoral agreement 8 . In these two equations, therefore, an additional regressor has been introduced that includes the propensity score obtained through this additional analysis. The inclusion of the propensity scores in the Mincer equations controls the potential impact on the estimates of the possible situation where the predominant type of collective bargaining in a firm is correlating with specific unobservable factors that may simultaneously affect wages.
The results obtained in relation to the control variables coincide with those in the literature. For the four waves analysed, evidence has been found of a positive wage premium for men, which, at the beginning of the period, was around 16 logarithmic points and at the end had fallen to 12. Returns to education are also positive and significant for the whole of the period analysed both for secondary and tertiary levels of education. Greater experience (measured through age) and seniority in the job position also have a positive effect on wages although, in the case of seniority, there is evidence of decreasing returns, given that the quadratic term is statistically significant at the usual levels. Having an indefinite contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract also has a positive effect on wages of between 4 and 7 logarithmic points depending on the year analysed. The most notable firm characteristics are the existence of a positive wage premium for those workers who are employed by firms of a larger size and those oriented towards European or international markets. With respect to the predominant level of collective bargaining, the evidence obtained indicates the existence of a wage premium associated with firm agreements.
In 2002, this premium was 6.5 logarithmic points which increased slightly in 2006 to 7.5 logarithmic points and then reduced to 6.4 logarithmic points in 2010 and to 5.4 logarithmic points in 2014. As the findings reveal, the premium has remained relatively stable over time, although a cyclical profile cannot be ruled out. In fact, the estimated coefficient increased during the years of economic growth, then reduced during the first phase of the crisis and also during the second recession after the labour reform of 2012.
This result is most probably explained by the wage dynamics of firms with their own agreement. Two elements confirm this hypothesis. First, based on the Wage Dynamics Network, Bertola et al. (2010) conclude that wage adjustment to changes in the economic situation is more frequent in firms that have their own collective agreement.
Similarly, Bentolila et al. (2010) highlight that newly-signed agreements are more sensitive to the cycle and, therefore, the large firms with their own agreements are those that "have been able to adapt more quickly to the new economic context" (Page 190) . Second, the data from the Annual Labour Cost Survey show that the wage dynamics of firms with more than 200 workers -those more likely to sign their own agreement -have been more moderate than the average since 2008. These data and the afore-mentioned studies coincide with the idea that the probable reduction in the wage differential between firm and sector agreements is essentially due to greater wage flexibility during the crisis in firms with their own agreements. The results obtained with respect to the absence of a collective agreement, a level which has gained importance in the latter years considered, show a negative effect on wages, which, in 2010, amounted to 11.2 logarithmic points but only 4.3 in 2014.
Thus, it seems that this regime, driven by the regulatory changes associated to the labour reform, is related to comparatively lower wages once the rest of the factors are controlled, and, consequently, linked to higher wage flexibility. The reduction of the average penalty observed between 2010 and 2014 may be due to the fact that, thanks to the greater flexibility, these firms, which are not subject to an agreement, implemented the bulk of the wage adjustment at the beginning of the crisis, a period for which there are no data available in order to confirm this. On the contrary, the firms subject to a sector agreement with an average duration of more than two years have needed more time to moderate their wages. This may have been facilitated after 2012 by some of the measures approved in the reform, such as the possibility of not applying agreements or the greater facility to withdraw non-negotiated wage supplements. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that the reduction of the wage penalty for the non-covered regime may also be due to a composition effect, owing to the entry of many small tertiary firms into this category.
The previous evidence corresponds to an analysis of averages based on an estimate using minimum least squares. In order to confirm that the effect of the different regimes of collective bargaining considered is not linear and varies across the whole of the wage distribution, the results obtained using quantile regressions are presented below. To do this, two different methods have been used: the standard quantile regression method (Koenker and Basset, 1978) and the unconditioned quantile regression method proposed more recently by Firpo et al. (2009) . Therefore, while the former quantifies the effects of the explanatory variables on the conditioned distribution of the dependent variable (and, consequently, on the within-groups wage dispersion for groups of workers with the same observed characteristics), the second quantifies the effects on the unconditioned distribution (also including an additional effect of between-groups wage differences), which is of more interest. workers located at the right hand side of the distribution. This result is probably due to important changes in the composition of the firm and workers over time.
The results in Table 5 (unconditioned regression) are similar, but have two differential characteristics which are worth highlighting. First, the positive premium of the firm-level agreement maintains its inverted U shape over time. Its effect is clear: at all times it widens the wage inequality at the lower part of the distribution, while it reduces it at the upper part and it is not affected by the economic crisis or the labour reform of 2012. On the other hand, the unconditioned distribution has a much more pronounced concavity than the conditioned distribution. This may be indicating that the between-groups effect dominates the central part of the distribution, while the opposite is the case at the two tails, as there the estimated premium is higher in the conditioned regression.
The final part of the empirical analysis involves the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder; is not constant as it has an inverted U shape being higher for the wages of the central quantiles). Furthermore, when the evolution over time is compared it is observed that the slope of the curve reduces, particularly in 2014 when it is substantially flatter.
As previously mentioned, the decomposition of these differences reveals that the endowment of characteristics has a greater relative explanatory capacity across the wage distribution in all years. Specifically, they represent around three quarters of the (even negative in some parts) at the extremes. The inverted U shape of the wage premium which is slightly off-centred towards the right enables us to conclude that the firm-level agreements favour the workers in the central part of the wage distribution more intensely and quite a lot less the workers with higher wages, while in general, they have no effect (except on 2006) on workers with the lowest wages of the firm. A possible explanation of these results would be that the recently hired workers are concentrated in this first decile as the same agreement can establish lower wages for them than the rest of the workers, provided that there is an "objective and reasonable justification" 10 . Figure 2 shows the decomposition of the wage differentials between workers covered by a sector agreement and those who are not in 2010 and 2014. Contrary to the results of Figure 1 , the evidence shown in Figure 2 reveals how the factor with the greatest explanatory capacity of the wage differential is -by far -the negative wage premium. The endowment of characteristics of uncovered workers seems only slightly worse than that of workers covered by sectoral agreements. For example, the differences observed in individual characteristics are practically imperceptible across the whole of the distribution (only a greater presence of young women). The differences in the job position characteristics are also growing in this case, as a result of the different incidence of temporary hiring over the whole of the wage distribution. The characteristics of the firms penalise uncovered workers in terms of their wages, particularly in 2010 as there is a greater presence of low salary sectors and of firms operating predominantly in the local market. The incidence of these characteristics is relatively constant over the distribution. However, the component with the highest explanatory capacity of the wage differentials observed is, in this case, the negative wage premium of workers without coverage with respect to the sectoral agreement. In 2010, the whole of the distribution is affected, although unequally as it has a clear inverted U shape and the highest penalties are observed at the two extremes of the distribution. On the other hand, in 2014, it has a growing trend as it progresses along the distribution from negative but decreasing values in the first half to positive and strongly increasing values at the right end. Therefore, the results of the most recent period seem to indicate that market forces significantly widen the wage differentials between workers, while sectoral agreements reduce them.
In short, when comparing the wage premiums that emerge under the different wage bargaining regimes, it can be observed that sectoral agreements, compared with the free functioning of the market, reduce wage differentials due to the positive premium generated. They also increase the wages of workers at the lower part of the wage distribution, reducing wage inequality. The firm-level agreements seem to rectify this correction. As they give rise to a higher positive premium for the workers of the central part and some of the workers on the right of the distribution, they re-establish part of the previously existing wage differentials. Therefore, it can be said that the wages established in sectoral agreements respond to the bargaining power of union organisations and favour the majority of their members and voters; relatively low wage earners. On the contrary, firm-level agreements enable the more productive firms to pay efficiency wages to the more productive workers, those who they have an interest in retaining and motivating, given that they accumulate more training and experience and their wages are situated in the middle and upper-middle part of the distribution. It is surprising, however, that the workers at the higher end of the distribution receive a relatively lower premium which probably does not reduce their wages with respect to the previous situation.
Conclusions
The objective of the research is to examine the wage differentials associated to different Therefore, the primary objective of the study is to analyse the wage differentials associated to the presence of a firm-level agreement and how they have evolved in the recent past, characterised by changes in the economic cycle and the recent labour reform which has given rise to this more decentralised type of bargaining. The evidence obtained in this sense confirms that the comparatively higher wages in firms covered by their own agreement in relation to the sectoral bargaining level are explained largely by the better endowment of labour force and firm characteristics. However, even when this element is controlled, a significant wage premium persists associated to firm-level agreements. This premium has remained relatively stable over time, falling only during the first phase of the economic crisis and does not seem to have been affected by the important regulatory changes associated to the labour reform of 2012.
The second objective of the study is to examine the impact on wages of an absence of a collective agreement, a regime which has also gained prevalence due to the labour reform. The results obtained in this sense suggest that this area of negotiation, which still has a fairly insignificant relative presence despite displaying an increasing trend, is associated, on average, to comparatively low wages, and, consequently, to higher wage flexibility.
When the analysis is extended across the whole of the wage distribution, the results obtained confirm that the wage differentials between firm-level and sectoral agreements are systematically explained in all points of the distribution by the different endowment of characteristics (being comparatively more relevant the differences in firm characteristics). Furthermore, the wage premium in favour of firm agreements has an inverted U shape (favouring workers in the middle and upper-middle part of the wage distribution to a greater extent). Similarly, when the wage differentials are decomposed between firms without an agreement compared with those covered by sectoral agreements, it can be observed that the main explanatory cause of the lower wages established by the market is the existence of a negative wage premium which varies throughout the distribution. Therefore, while the negative premium in 2010 affects the whole of the distribution, it does so unequally, implying higher penalties at the extremes of the distribution. On the contrary, in 2014, the premium begins at negative values and increases throughout the distribution, reaching clearly positive values at the extreme right. This evidence seems to suggest, therefore, that in the absence of an agreement the wage differentials widen between workers, while sectoral agreements reduce them.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the findings of this study seem to suggest that wages established in sectoral agreements respond to the negotiating power of union organisations and favour the majority of their members and voters, while firmlevel agreements enable the more productive firms to pay efficiency wages to the workers in the middle and upper-middle part of the wage distribution. 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.056*** -0.114*** -0.077*** Median 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.075*** -0.069*** -0.025*** Percentile 75 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.088*** 0.090*** -0.026*** 0.020*** Percentile 90 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.093*** 0.094*** -0.011*** 0.044*** Notes: Results obtained from the estimation of conditioned quantile regressions incorporating the controls detailed in Table 3 . ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Table 5 . Wage gap by collective bargaining regime in Spain throughout the wage distribution.
Tables and figures
Unconditioned quantile regression. Table 3 . ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
